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The “Duty to Cooperate” in English and French 










In Yam Seng Pte Limited v International Trade Corporation Limited,1 Leggatt J argues, in the 
steps of Lord Steyn,2 that good faith may be implied in fact “in any ordinary commercial 
contract based on the presumed intention of the parties”,3 which is to be objectively ascertained 
“… by attributing to [the parties] the purposes and values which reasonable people in their 
situation would have had”.4 He contended that a number of duties could be derived from good 
faith among which “duties of cooperation” in the performance of contracts.5 The background 
against which Leggatt J built his argument about the relationship between good faith and the 
“duty to cooperate” is particularly interesting. He emphasized that “[it] would be a mistake … 
to suppose that willingness to recognize a doctrine of good faith in the performance of contracts 
reflects a divide between civil law and common law systems or between continental 
paternalism and Anglo-Saxon individualism”.6 The main reason he gives is “[the] fact that such 
a doctrine has long been recognized in the United States”.7  
On the one hand, his reasoning may be criticized from a contextual perspective as the 
notion of good faith seems to have taken solid ground in United States law primarily as a result 
of the efforts of the “father” of the Uniform Commercial Code, Karl Llewellyn (1893-1962), 
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1 [2013] EWHC 111 (QB). 
2 J. Steyn, “Contract Law: Fulfilling the Reasonable Expectations of Honest Men”, Law Quarterly 
Review, CXIII (1997), p. 433. See also J. Steyn, “The Role of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Contract 
Law: A Hair Shirt Philosophy”, Denning Law Journal [1991], p. 131. 
3 Yam Seng, note 1 above, at [131]. 
4 Ibid., at [144].  
5 Ibid., at [145]; Leggatt J argued that good faith also implies that a party to a contract which takes 
decisions affecting both parties should exercise its power honestly and reasonably. He also underscores 
that onerous terms on which a party seeks to rely must be brought to the attention of the other party.  




rather than as a result of a natural evolution of the common law in the United States.8 Llewellyn 
himself was influenced by German law9 in which good faith plays a key role.10 On the other 
hand, assuming that good faith has the same implications in all systems of the continental 
tradition is also problematic — much ink, for example, has been spilled on delineating the 
diverse scopes of good faith in the various Member States of the European Union.11 The notion 
of good faith is not homogenous within the continental tradition itself and any generalization 
underestimates the legal cultural diversity, which exists even on the same continent. 
This article examines the nuances of cooperation in the English and the French legal 
landscape which may provide insights into Leggatt J’s reasoning. Cooperation can be 
understood as a (casual) expectation from the parties, but also, in a legal dimension, as a “duty 
to cooperate” that is considered here. English law has been traditionally hostile to the notion 
of good faith, which, in turn, sheds light on why the relationship between good faith and the 
“duty to cooperate” is uncertain. In parallel, cooperation itself seems to be a well-established, 
autonomous duty from the nineteenth century, despite a fairly limited scope of application. 
Moreover, it is interesting that courts may be willing to imply a duty of good faith in fiduciary 
relationships and in certain types of contracts where good faith is characterized as a duty of 
cooperation.12 The first category is not controversial, for English law has long recognized 
fiduciary relationships as special relationships whose scope may potentially be broad, and 
which require the highest degree of care. The latter category, as explained below, appears 
fuzzier. 
By contrast, in the French legal tradition, there is debate over whether the “duty to 
cooperate” is an element of good faith: we will see that the relationship between cooperation, 
loyalty, and good faith is unclear. Some French authorities are convinced that it is not 
accidental that the “duty to cooperate” was not explicitly consecrated in the text of the 
ordonnance n° 2016-131 of 10 February 2016, which implemented a reform of the French law 
of contract. Instead of a “duty to cooperate”, however, the new French legislation endorses a 
minimalist definition of good faith which, as explained below, permits a much broader 
application of the principle.13  
 
GOOD FAITH IN YAM SENG 
 
                                                          
8 It has been asserted that Llewellyn was “primarily responsible for the Code’s adoption of a general 
obligation of good faith”. See P. MacMahon, “Good Faith and Fair Dealing as an Underenforced Legal 
Norm”, Minnesota Law Review, XCIX (2015), p. 2060.  
9 See M. Ansaldi, “The German Llewellyn”, Brooklyn Law Review, LVIII (1992), p. 705, J. Whitman, 
“Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn's German Sources for the Uniform 
Commercial Code”, Yale Law Journal, XCVII (1987), p. 156. 
10 From reallocating risks in contracts to serving as a foundation to develop jurisprudential solutions. 
See W. Ebke and B. Steinhauer, “The Doctrine of Good Faith in German Law”, in J. Beatson and D. 
Friedmann (eds.), Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (1995).   
11 See S. Whittaker and R. Zimmermann (eds.), Good Faith in European Contract Law (2000); J. 
Cartwright and M. Hesselink (eds.), Precontractual Liability in European Private Law (2011). 
12 See, for instance, Globe Motors v TRW Lucas Varity Electric Steering [2016] EWCA 396 [67]. See 
also Yam Seng, note 1 above, at [131]. 
13 Article 1104 of the French Civil Code provides: “Contracts must be negotiated, formed, and 
performed in good faith. This provision is a matter of public policy”. 
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Before engaging in comparative analysis, Leggatt J’s propositions about good faith and 
cooperation in Yam Seng require examination.14 In that case Leggatt J opened a “Pandora’s 
box” by trying to persuade the English legal community, which is traditionally hostile15 to the 
notion of good faith, that the principle exists in English law:  
 
I doubt that English law has reached the stage, however, where it is ready to recognize a 
requirement of good faith as a duty implied by law, even as a default rule, into all commercial 
contracts. Nevertheless, there seems to me to be no difficulty, following the established 
methodology of English law for the implication of terms in fact, in implying such a duty (of 
good faith) in any ordinary commercial contract based on the presumed intention of the 
parties.16 
 
Leggatt J argued that there is “nothing novel or foreign to English law in recognizing an implied 
duty of good faith in the performance of contracts”.17 
He is not the first to take such a bold step. In Good Faith in English Law, for example, 
O’Connor had argued that good faith exists in the common law because honesty, fairness, and 
reasonableness are all principles of English law and, at the same time, they are “universally 
accepted and distinctive moral elements associated with good faith”.18 Other authors have 
engaged in functional comparisons to conclude that the absence of a general principle of good 
faith in English law is “partly compensated by the law of remedies, which greatly limits the 
possibility of abuse of rights”.19 
Leggatt J, however, identified two main aspects of good faith in English law — the 
observance of “standards of commercial dealing which are so generally accepted that the 
contracting parties would reasonably be understood to take them as read”20 and “fidelity to the 
parties’ bargain”.21 He contended that the question of fidelity to the bargain is a matter of 
construction, which in turn explained cases in which “terms requiring cooperation in the 
performance of the contract have been implied”,22 such as Mackay v Dick.23  
Leggatt J underscored that good faith is “sensitive to context”;24 thus the expectations 
for a “simple exchange” differ from the expectations regarding “longer term relationships 
                                                          
14 The decision concerned an exclusive distributorship agreement for certain fragrances with the brand 
name “Manchester United” in specified territories in the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Australasia. 
15 The classic example is Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128, 138 where good faith was declared 
“unworkable in practice”; For many, good faith is irreconcilable with the fundamental values of the 
common law such as legal certainty and the pursuit of self-interest which characterizes market 
economies. See, for instance, M. Chen-Wishart, Contract Law (5th ed.; 2015), p. 216.  
16 Yam Seng, note 1 above, at [131]. 
17 Ibid., at [145]; Emphasis added.  
18 J. F. O’Connor, Good Faith in English Law (1990), p. 10.   
19 D. Friedmann, “Good Faith and Remedies for Breach of Contract”, in J. Beatson and D. Friedmann 
(eds.), Good Faith and Fault in Contract Law (1995), p. 425.   
20 Yam Seng, note 1 above, at [138]; One of these standards, according to Leggatt J, is the “expectation 
of honesty”. 
21 Ibid., at [139]. 
22 Ibid. 
23 (1881) 6 App Cas 251.  
24 Yam Seng, note 1 above, at [141]. 
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between the parties”.25 The latter, sometimes called “relational contracts”, require a “high 
degree of communication, cooperation and predictable performance based on mutual trust and 
confidence and involve expectations of loyalty … which are implicit in the parties’ 
understanding and necessary to give business efficacy to the arrangements”.26 For Leggatt J, 
examples of such contracts included joint venture agreements, franchise agreements, and long-
term distributorship agreements.27 
Some common law scholars have commended Leggatt J’s approach but criticized him 
for not going far enough. Collins, for instance, argued that it is “regrettable” that in spite of 
making “ambitious claims about good faith and relational contracts”, Leggatt J based his 
decision “on the narrow ground of actual dishonesty”.28 He underlined that “there is a class of 
contracts where intensified duties of loyalty and cooperation arise”.29 These duties “require 
loyalty to the aims of the joint project”.30 Campbell, on the other hand, emphasized that 
“Leggatt J emphatically shows that untrammelled self-interest is not and cannot be the basis of 
the English law of contract…”.31 Yet, he is troubled that “Leggatt J is unable to tell us why it 
is right to go further in this particular case, but not in most others”.32 In particular, he is worried 
that Leggatt J did not clearly express the difference between relational and discrete contracts, 
which induced legal uncertainty.33 The relational/discrete contract distinction was drawn by 
one of the “fathers” of relational contract theory, Ian Roderick Macneil (1929-2010).34  
Whereas, in principle, we share Collins’ and Campbell’s concerns, these authors have 
unrealistic expectations of a decision by the High Court. Given the traditional English hostility 
towards good faith, it seems probable that grounding the decision on a duty of cooperation 
implied by law, as suggested by Collins,35 would have caused quite a stir. It seems that by 
attributing good faith and, by consequence, a “duty to cooperate” to the presumed intentions 
of the parties, Leggatt J was paying his due respects to the fundamental principle of “freedom 
of contract”. Unlike terms implied in law which traditionally operate as default rules for entire 
categories of contract, terms implied in fact are necessary for a particular contract.36 In parallel, 
it should also be noted that legal theorists have not managed to draw a clear distinction between 
                                                          
25 Ibid., at [142]. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 H. Collins, “Implied Terms: The Foundation in Good Faith and Fair Dealing”, Current Legal 
Problems, LXVII (2014), p. 329. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid.  
31 D. Campbell, “Good Faith and the Ubiquity of the “Relational” Contract”, The Modern Law Review, 
LXXVII (2014), p. 490. 
32 Ibid., p. 489. 
33 Ibid., p. 490. 
34 See I. R. Macneil, “Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a 
‘Rich Classificatory Apparatus’”, Northwestern University Law Review, LXXVIII (1981), p. 1018; 
Macneil, “Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presentation”, Virginia Law Review, LX (1974), p. 
586. 
35 Collins, note 28 above, p. 329. 
36 As M. Chen-Wishart asserts regarding terms implied in fact: “The reasoning is that whether through 
forgetfulness, lack of time, or bad drafting, the parties have failed to include a term which they would 
have done, had they thought about it, or had the time to draft it properly”, Chen-Wishart, note 15 above, 
p. 392. See also Marks and Spencer v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust, note 89 below.   
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relational and discrete contracts for decades.37 Considering the inductive reasoning and the case 
by case approach of the common law, it does not seem unusual that Leggatt J did not offer a 
clear definition.38 
However, Leggatt J’s use of the term “good faith”, as well as the association of good 
faith with cooperation, may be misleading from a comparative Anglo-French perspective, 
particularly because Leggatt J himself situated his argument in the long-standing debate about 
the common law/civil law divide, as mentioned above. We will see below that 
1) cooperation has different doctrinal foundations and scope in England and in France;  
2) whereas the relationship between cooperation and good faith is uncertain in both 
jurisdictions, the French “duty to cooperate” lives in the shadow of good faith and 
may remind English lawyers of the stringent standards of care and loyalty expected 
in fiduciary relationships. By contrast, the English “duty to cooperate” has a life of 
its own; 
3) the duty of good faith à l’anglaise could essentially be an extended “duty to 
cooperate”. In that sense, the good faith “practiced” by some English judges could 
differ in important ways from “French” good faith.  
 
COOPERATION – LONG-ESTABLISHED “ENGLISH” DUTY 
WITH LIMITED SCOPE 
 
We turn to the scope and nature of the “duty to cooperate” in the English tradition to 
demonstrate that, even from an English perspective, Leggatt J seems to go too far in his 
reasoning about the role of good faith in English law. This inquiry will also serve as the 
foundation for the comparison with French law below. 
It has already been suggested that the “duty to cooperate” is a distinct duty in the 
common law which is independent from good faith: “[the duty] does not need the label of good 
faith to signal its core concerns or guide its application”.39 An historical examination reveals 
that it is a long-established duty with a relatively limited scope whose essence is intimately tied 
to notions such as “workability” and “necessity”. This duty is illustrative of the well-
established common law value of commercial sensibility.  
 
                                                          
37 It has been asserted: “One of the causes for this typical vagueness [of the relational contract] has been 
the tendency of leading relational theorists to refrain from a ‘positive’ definition of the constitutive 
elements of a relational contract. Instead, a ‘negative’ definition was commonly adopted, according to 
which a relational contract is a contract, the nature of which departs substantially from the nature of a 
discrete, one-shot commercial bargain”. See Y. Adar and M. Gelbard, “The Role of Remedies in The 
Relational Theory of Contract — A Preliminary Inquiry”, European Review of Contract Law, VII 
(2011), p. 409. 
38 Moreover, speaking extra-judicially, he clarified: “In truth, there is no hard and fast distinction: the 
extent to which a contract has ‘relational’ features is a matter of degree. But the term ‘relational 
contract’ is a useful label to identify contracts which are towards one end of the spectrum”. See Mr 
Justice Leggatt, “Contractual Duties of Good faith”, Lecture to the Commercial Bar Association, 18 
October 2016.  
39 J. M. Paterson, “Good Faith Duties in Contract Performance”, Oxford University Commonwealth Law 
Journal, XIV (2014), pp. 293-294. 
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The Origins of “English” Cooperation 
 
Cases in which a “duty to cooperate” was implied, including Yam Seng, generally refer to 
Mackay v Dick40 as authority for the principle, even though the decision itself does not 
explicitly use the term “cooperation”, which may be the root of the misuse (or at least the loose 
use) of terms this article purports to shed light on. The case concerns a contract for the sale of 
an excavating machine. The buyer was only liable to pay for the machine if it excavated a 
certain amount of clay within a given time at a railway cutting that the buyer was engaged in 
constructing. If the machine failed the test, the buyer was entitled to return the digger within 
two months, without paying the contract price. The buyer failed to provide the necessary 
facilities to test the machine and purported to reject the machine. The seller sued for the contract 
price. The House of Lords held that the seller was entitled to be paid.  
Lord Blackburn and Lord Watson reached the same conclusion on somewhat different 
grounds. Lord Blackburn underlined: 
as a general rule ... where in a written contract it appears that both parties have agreed 
that something shall be done, which cannot effectually be done unless both concur in 
doing it, the construction of the contract is that each agrees to do all that is necessary 
to be done on his part for the carrying out of that thing, though there may be no express 
words to that effect. What is the part of each must depend on circumstances.41 
He based his reasoning on an English case from 1469 concerning the famous bell of Mildenhall 
because,42 in his words, “it is on it that the different digests laying down the principle are all 
founded, and because [he thought] it is obvious good sense and justice”.43 It is worth 
highlighting that a key factor in the English case, as summarized by Lord Blackburn, was the 
particular skill of the defendant who was a brazier (a person making articles from brass). The 
court concluded that it was on him to weigh and put the bell into the fire.44 Common law digests 
generally include the case concerning the bell of Mildenhall in their section on conditions.45 
In that light, it should be noted that in Mackay v Dick Lord Watson referred to a passage 
from Bell’s Principles, one of the first treatises on Scots law: “If the debtor bound under a 
certain condition have impeded or prevented the event, it is held as accomplished. If the creditor 
had done all that he can to fulfil a condition which is ineumbent on himself, it is held sufficient 
implement”.46 He also emphasized that this is a “doctrine borrowed from the civil law, which 
has long been recognized in … [Scotland]”.47 Indeed, the quoted “Scottish” passage 
immediately invokes former Article 1178 of the French Civil Code enacted in 1804: “A 
                                                          
40 (1881) 6 App Cas 251. 
41 Ibid., p. 263; Emphasis ours. 
42 The case was reported in the Yearbooks of Edward IV (Year 9th). The plaintiffs brought the bell of 
Mildenhall on their own costs to the defendant in Norwich where it was supposed to be weighed and 
put into the fire, so that the defendant could make a tenor to agree with the other bells. The weighing 
was necessary, so that the new tenor could agree with the other bells. The contract did not explicitly 
state who was supposed to weigh the bell and put it into the fire. 
43 Mackay, note 40 above, p. 264. 
44 Ibid., p. 263. 
45 See for instance K. D'Anvers, A General Abridgment of the Common Law (1713), II(1), p. 109. 




condition is deemed fulfilled where it is the debtor, bound under that condition, who has 
prevented it from being fulfilled”.  
While we discuss the doctrinal underpinning of “French” cooperation below, it should 
be stressed at this stage that French doctrine is still ambivalent about the link between former 
Article 1178 and performance in good faith. Charles Demolombe (1804-1887), who wrote one 
of the first major treatises on French law post-codification, had suggested that Article 1178 had 
to be examined in connection with former Article 1134, which required performance in good 
faith, because the debtor’s prevention of the fulfillment of the condition amounts to bad faith.48 
In more modern times, the French Cour de cassation has been criticized when it reverted to 
Article 1134 without considering Article 1178.49 Even if we are to assume that this specific 
rule on conditions is illustrative or closely tied to the principle of good faith, reasoning by 
analogy  — that the existence of a similar rule in English law evidences that good faith exists 
in English law (in the steps of Leggatt J in Yam Seng, for instance) — seems overly ambitious 
because, as we will see below, good faith in the French tradition is a fundamental principle 
which guides the entire lifecycle of the contract. 
It is also worth pointing out, of course, that one can find other examples of common 
law cases from the nineteenth century in which courts implied terms requiring cooperation. For 
instance, in the Australian case Butt v M’Donald50 it was underlined that “[it] is a general rule 
applicable to every contract that each party agrees, by implication, to do all such things as are 
necessary on his part to enable the other party to have the benefit of the contract”.51 Both the 
rule in Mackay and the rule in Butt use necessity as a criterion. However, the rule in Butt seems 
to go further because a party has to do everything necessary to enable the other “to have the 
benefit of the contract” rather than do what is necessary to merely enable performance.  
Indeed, in the 1960s, Burrows argued that the duty of cooperation may cover two main 
sets of circumstances — situations where A interferes with B’s “enjoyment of the subject-
matter of the contract” and situations where A interferes with the “actual performance of the 
contract promises”.52 By examining a series of cases, Burrows concludes that the first aspect 
of the duty (no interference with the other party’s enjoyment of the subject-matter) is rarely 
recognized by the common law in practice:  
 
… the courts have demonstrated that they regard freedom of trade and competition and 
the right to make a profit out of one's property as of paramount "social desirability." A 
man cannot be expected to let his own business interests suffer just because he might 
by so doing make things a little less profitable for the other party to one of his 
contracts.53 
                                                          
48 See C. Demolombe, Cours de Code Napoléon (1869), III, p. 331. 
49 In that light, see B Mallet-Bricout, “La condition suspensive, «réputée accomplie», relative à 
l’obtention d’un prêt bancaire, dans une vente immobilière. Subtiles nuances ou éternelles incertitudes? 
(À propos de deux décisions de la 3e Chambre civile de la Cour de cassation)”, RJT, XLIII (2009), p. 
311.  
50 (1896) 7 QLJ 68. 
51 Ibid., pp. 70–71; Emphasis ours.  
52 J. F. Burrows, “Contractual Co-operation and the Implied Term”, Modern Law Review, XXXI (1968), 
p. 390.  
53 Ibid., p. 395. 
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He underlined that whereas the second aspect of the duty (no interference with the other party’s 
performance of what is promised) is more common, it does not go much further “than absolute 
necessity”.54 
In that light, Mona Oil Equipment v Rhodesia Railways55 provides ample illustration of 
the unwillingness of some English judges to go beyond “absolute necessity”. Notably, Devlin 
J underlined:  
It is, no doubt, true that every business contract depends for its smooth working on co-
operation, but in the ordinary business contract, and apart, of course, from express 
terms, the law can enforce co-operation only in a limited degree — to the extent that is 
necessary to make the contract workable. For any higher degree of co-operation the 
parties must rely on the desire that both of them usually have that the business should 
get done.56 
In the said case, the defendants did not do anything to remove a misunderstanding that had 
arisen, but Devlin J held that “the removal of misunderstanding is quite beyond the reach of 




It seems difficult to identify a coherent conception of cooperation which emerges from 
contemporary English case law primarily because of the unclear relationship between 
cooperation and good faith.58 It is obvious, however, that unlike Leggatt J, many English judges 
are reluctant to recognize and apply a “duty to cooperate”, or, at least, walk on eggshells when 
confronted with the notion. English judges remain committed to objective interpretation of 
agreements and the test of necessity set forth in the “early days” of “English” cooperation. At 
the same time, some courts may be more willing to imply a duty of good faith if it is essentially 




There are modern cases in which parties expressly refer to an obligation to cooperate or act in 
good faith in their long-term agreement, but courts construe the obligation rather narrowly. For 
instance, Compass Group UK and Ireland Ltd v Mid Essex Hospital Services NHS Trust60 
concerned an agreement for the supply of services which contained a clause requiring parties 
                                                          
54 Ibid., p. 404. 
55 [1949] 2 All ER 1014.  
56 Ibid., p. 1018; Emphasis ours.  
57 Ibid.  
58 As seen in the cases we discuss below, one cannot find a consistent use of the terms even in express 
provisions. In Compass, the contract required parties to “cooperate in good faith”. In Portsmouth, 
parties had to “deal in good faith and in mutual cooperation”, which suggests these are separate duties. 
In Bristol, only a good faith obligation was mentioned.  
59 Per Beatson LJ in Globe Motors v TRW Lucas Varity Electric Steering Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 396 at 
[67]. 
60 [2013] EWCA Civ 200. 
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to “cooperate in good faith”.61 Jackson LJ, however, quashed the position of the trial judge that 
the obligation applied to the contract as a whole: 
 … in my judgment care must be taken not to construe a general and potentially open-
ended obligation such as an obligation to ‘co-operate’ or ‘to act in good faith’ as 
covering the same ground as other, more specific, provisions, lest it cut across those 
more specific provisions and any limitations in them.62   
The submission that the contract contained an implied term of good faith was also 
rejected. Jackson LJ concluded that an “important feature” of cases in which such a term was 
implied was that they contained terms allowing one of the parties to exercise discretion, which 
did not “involve a simple decision whether or not to exercise an absolute contractual right”, 
but rather “making an assessment or choosing from a range of options, taking into account the 
interests of both parties”.63 In essence, this means that a party will not “exercise its discretion 
in an arbitrary, capricious or irrational manner”.64 
A similar conclusion was reached in Portsmouth City Council v Ensign Highways,65 
which concerned a long-term contract for the maintenance of a highway, which contained a 
clause under the heading “Liaising and Partnering” stating that the parties “shall deal fairly, in 
good faith and in mutual co-operation with one another ...”. The court rejected both the 
argument that the clause applied to the rest of the agreement, as well as the argument that good 
faith was implied. It should be noted that it is likely that Compass and Portsmouth would have 
had a different outcome in France because, as we will see below, good faith is a key principle 
of French law applying to contracts no matter if parties have explicitly agreed on its application. 
In addition, the explicit referral to good faith and cooperation might indicate to a French judge 
that these principles are of importance to the parties.  
There are cases reminiscent of Mackay v Dick because they involve conditional 
obligations, such as Bristol Rovers v Sainsbury’s Supermarket.66 A key difference between the 
two cases, however, is that in Mackay, the contract was entered into via exchange of letters, 
whereas Bristol Rovers concerns a contract with lengthy and detailed express provisions. The 
case shows that if a provision requiring good faith in the performance contradicts the black 
letter requirements of a specific provision, the specific provision may trump the “good faith 
requirement”.  
Notably, Bristol Rovers had undertaken to sell a football stadium subject to conditions 
precedent. One was obtaining a permission which did not contain time restrictions on 
deliveries. Both parties could terminate the agreement if such a permission was not obtained 
within a certain date. The agreement contained a clause requiring “all reasonable endeavours” 
and a clause “requiring good faith” in the parties’ respective obligations. Sainsbury’s did not 
                                                          
61 Clause 3.5 of their agreement stipulated: “The Trust and the Contractor will cooperate with each other 
in good faith and will take all reasonable action as is necessary for the efficient transmission of 
information and instructions and to enable the Trust or, as the case may be, any Beneficiary to derive 
the full benefit of the Contract”. 
62 Compass, note 60 above, at [157]. 
63 Ibid., at [83]. 
64 Ibid.  
65 [2015] EWHC 1969 (TCC). 
66 [2016] EWCA Civ 160. 
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manage to obtain a permit without time restrictions. Then, as there was an explicit clause 
requiring them to appeal the decision by the local authority only if they had more than a 60% 
chance of success, they terminated the agreement by notice. In the meantime, Bristol Rovers 
managed to obtain a permission without the limitation on deliveries. They argued the 
agreement was terminated in breach of contract. 
Both the High Court and the Court of Appeal ruled in favor of Sainsbury’s because they 
had complied with the provision requiring them to appeal the local authority’s decision only if 
they had a 60% chance of success or more. Floyd LJ emphasized: “I have great difficulty in 
understanding on what principle it can be held that [Sainsbury’s] reliance on that contractual 
provision can lack good faith”.67 Moreover, he also held that “all reasonable endeavours” could 
not be understood to require Sainsbury’s “to give consent to Bristol” to file its own application 
before the local authority.68  
In other words, absent the 60% test, the case would have had a different result. 
Moreover, theoretically, if neither the 60% test nor the two general obligations requiring good 
faith and reasonable efforts were part of the contract, Bristol Rovers could have invoked 
Mackay v Dick and argued a duty of cooperation was implied given the conditional obligation.  
 
No express provisions 
 
Recent case law demonstrates that English courts may establish a “duty to cooperate” in certain 
agreements even if there is no express provision to that effect. However, it seems difficult to 
identify a clear-cut rule on which courts rely to identify agreements to which such a duty is 
relevant. By contrast, we will see below that while French law is also hesitant about the types 
of agreements to which cooperation applies, the problem is less palpable because of the 
overreaching duty of good faith which governs the entire lifecycle of all types of contracts.  
Leggatt J’s approach in Yam Seng69 certainly appears more generous compared to the 
approach taken in Mackay and Mona Oil. It stands apart for a number of reasons. First, Leggatt 
J stated that good faith and, by consequence, a “duty to cooperate” can be implied in a specific 
category of contracts — relational agreements,70 which he himself defined as contracts 
requiring “a high degree of communication, cooperation and predictable performance based on 
mutual trust and confidence and involve expectations of loyalty which are not legislated for in 
the express terms of the contract but are implicit in the parties' understanding and necessary to 
give business efficacy to the arrangements”.71 Leggatt J drew the conclusion that the contract 
                                                          
67 Ibid., at [98]. 
68 Ibid., at [97]. 
69 Yam Seng, note 1 above.   
70 Relational theory is associated with the work of Stewart Macaulay and Ian Roderick Macneil. See S. 
Macaulay, “Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study”, American Sociological 
Review, XXVIII (1963), p. 55; S. Macaulay, “The Use and Non-Use of Contracts in the Manufacturing 
Industry”, Practical Lawyer, IX (1963), p. 13; S. Macaulay, “An Empirical View of Contract”, 
Wisconsin Law Review, [1985], p.  465. See I. R. Macneil, “Economic Analysis of Contractual 
Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a ‘Rich Classificatory Apparatus’”, Northwestern University 
Law Review, LXXVIII (1981), p. 1018; I. R. Macneil, “Restatement (Second) of Contracts and 
Presentation”, Virginia Law Review, LX (1974), p. 586. 
71 Yam Seng, note 1 above, at [142].  
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in question is a relational agreement based on the context.72 In that light, it is interesting that 
he took care in describing the emotions and feelings of the parties throughout the development 
and downfall of their business relationship, which is not typical of English decisions.73  
Second, Leggatt J was concerned about the dishonesty of one of the parties to the 
agreement, which he chose to address via the principles of good faith and cooperation: “In 
some contractual contexts the relevant background expectations may extend further to an 
expectation that the parties will share information relevant to the performance of the contract 
such that a deliberate omission to disclose such information may amount to bad faith”.74 
Leggatt J implied a degree of cooperation which seems substantially higher from the test of 
necessity and workability which prevails in English case law. The agreement could still be 
performed despite the dishonesty — it would just not be as profitable as originally intended. 
Moreover, unlike French law which imposes a duty to disclose at the negotiation stage, as we 
will see below, English law is concerned with non-disclosure in limited cases.75 In addition, as 
cooperation is a long-established duty in the English tradition, Leggatt J could have skipped 
the reference to good faith, which is a contentious notion from an English perspective, but he 
did not.  
Cases following Yam Seng are considerably less bold in their propositions on 
cooperation and good faith. Furthermore, courts take extra care when implying duties of 
cooperation. In Swallowfalls Ltd v Monaco Yachting,76 for instance, the Court of Appeal found 
a “duty to cooperate” requiring the confirmation of the achievement of milestones and the 
counter-signature of stage certificates in a shipbuilding contract and its associated loan 
agreement. It held that such “proposed implied term is an ordinary implication in any contract 
for the performance of which co-operation is required”. It emphasized that “[a] shipbuilding 
contract is such a contract since … the builder only earns a stage payment when the buyer's 
representative signs a certificate that the relevant stage or milestone has been achieved”.77 It 
further clarified: “… if the buyer proposes a variation and the builder notifies the buyer of the 
                                                          
72 He sided with Lord Hoffmann’s famous restatement of the principles of interpretation in Investors 
Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896. Hoffmann argued in 
favor of purposive (contextual) rather than literal interpretation. His views were challenged in Arnold v 
Britton [2015] UKSC 36. 
73 “To begin with, the business relationship between the parties was a warm one ...”, Yam Seng, note 1 
above, at [2]; “Mr Tuli broke down, he felt angry and outraged at what he regarded as unwarranted 
attacks on his integrity. Those feelings were equally apparent when he gave evidence”, Ibid., at [9]; “He 
said that at this meeting Mr Tuli for the first time was cold and brisk”, Ibid., at [56], etc. 
74 Yam Seng, note 1 above, at [142]. 
75 English law relieves non-disclosure in uberrimae fidei contracts, fiduciary relationships, etc. 
However, it has not embraced a general duty to disclose. One of the most striking cases, from a French 
perspective, is Keates v Cadogan (1851) 10 CB 591. The claimant had entered into a lease agreement, 
but the property was uninhabitable. The defendant had not informed the claimant about its poor 
condition during the negotiations. Yet, the court found that there was no obligation to inform the tenant 
during the negotiation stage. Overall, English law tends to respond to active misrepresentations, but the 
doctrine of misrepresentation itself has a fairly narrow scope. For instance, it is relatively difficult to 
prove misrepresentation when statements of opinion turn out to be inaccurate, when somebody makes 
a statement of intention and subsequently changes their mind, etc.  
76 [2014] EWCA Civ 186.  
77 Ibid., at [32]. 
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impact in price, performance and delivery, the buyer must co-operate to agree, propose an 
alternative solution or abandon the proposed variation”.  
Because of the wording, it seems somewhat unclear whether the Court of Appeal held 
that such a duty is implied in all shipbuilding contracts, which would mean that it established 
a general principle of cooperation applicable to specific categories of contracts, or that it merely 
implied such a duty in the case at hand because of the circumstances, i.e. that payment depends 
on the signature of certificates, which can be seen as a conditional obligation. It is worth 
mentioning that the court explicitly stated that “[the] implied term as to co-operation will do 
all that is required to make the contract work”,78 which seems to go a step further than the tests 
established in Mackay and Mona Oil discussed above. Indeed, imposing a duty to “agree, 
propose an alternative solution or abandon the proposed variation” seems to go beyond 
workability or necessity because it may be realistic to expect that in many cases a shipbuilder 
can continue construction even if the buyer has not responded to a proposed variation. It should 
also be noted that French courts can reach the same result as the Court of Appeal by relying on 
the general duty of good faith without explicitly referring to cooperation. 
 In Globe Motors v TRW Lucas Varity Electric Steering,79 in turn, Beatson LJ seems to 
have lent his support for Leggatt J’s approach in Yam Seng:  
 
… in certain categories of long-term contract, the court may be more willing to imply 
a duty to co-operate or, in the language used by Leggatt J in Yam Seng … a duty of good 
faith. Leggatt J had in mind contracts between those whose relationship is characterized 
as a fiduciary one and those involving a longer-term relationship between parties who 
make a substantial commitment.80 
 
However, it appears that his view of good faith is much narrower — for Beatson LJ, good faith 
is characterized as a “duty to cooperate”. Moreover, he explicitly referred to post-Yam Seng 
cases in which English courts refused to imply a duty of good faith in longer-term relationships, 
thus stressing the principle’s limits — Carewatch Care Services Limited v Focus Caring 
Services Limited81 and Acer Investment Management Ltd v Mansion Group Ltd.82 
 It is interesting that in both Carewatch and Acer, the High Court considered Yam Seng 
and recognized the principle it established. Nevertheless, in both cases the judges found that 
the rule was not applicable in the circumstances at hand. In Carewatch, a key factor was the 
fact that the franchising contracts in question contained “very detailed express terms” and that 
the judge could not identify a “clear lacuna” that had to be filled.83 In Acer, the judge was not 
convinced that an agreement between distributors and their financial advisor was relational 
because the parties did not regard it as exclusive and they could terminate it upon notice.84 
                                                          
78 Ibid., at [35]; Emphasis ours.  
79 [2016] EWCA 396. 
80 Ibid., at [67]; Note he did not establish the rule was applicable in the case at hand.  
81 [2014] EWHC 2313 (Ch). 
82 [2014] EWHC 3011 (QB).  
83 Carewatch, note 81 above, at [109]. 
84 Acer, note 82 above, at [109].  
13 
 
Another important example is provided by Nazir Ali v Petroleum Company of Trinidad 
and Tobago,85 which concerned a long-term relationship between an employer and an 
employee. Even though the Privy Council did not consider if the contract was relational, it 
could be regarded as one. Yet, even if it is not, employment contracts are governed by a duty 
of good faith.86 The employee had worked for the company for eleven years when he received 
a scholarship in the form of a loan by the company to study. The agreement contained a clause 
stipulating that loan repayment would be waived if the employee returned to work for the 
company for five years after he graduated. A year and a half after his return, he received, along 
with other employees, a notice inviting him to consider redundancy, which he accepted. The 
company sought repayment of the loan, which it set off against the redundancy money. The 
employee claimed the redundancy money without the offsets and argued that two terms were 
to be implied in the loan agreement: one requiring the company to allow him to work for five 
years if he wished to do so and another that repayment of the loan would be waived if the 
company terminated his employment for reasons other than dishonesty. In other words, the 
employee maintained that the company owed him duties of cooperation.  
The Privy Council underlined with reference to the rule in Mackay v Dick: “There are 
many other examples of such implied terms in cases where the co-operation of one party to a 
contract is essential to the performance by the other of his obligations”.87 However, it also 
seems to have resonated the words of Devlin J cited above: “Whilst the principle is well 
understood, the content of any term to be implied must be tailored to the necessity of the 
particular case”.88 The Privy Council relied on the restatement of the rules of implication laid 
out in Marks and Spencer v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust89 to conclude that a “duty 
to cooperate” can be implied only if it is necessary to make the contract work.90 This would be 
the case if the term is (a) so obvious that it goes without saying (b) it is necessary to give the 
contract business efficacy.91 The Privy Council held that both terms failed the necessity test. 
The first one “[went] further than could be necessary to achieve the objective of the contract’.92 
The second one was ‘too narrowly expressed”.93 
At the same time, the Privy Council recognized that a broader term was implied: it was 
necessary for the company not to do anything “of its own initiative” to “prevent” the employee 
from proving his services.94 However, it did not follow that “in every case of dismissal for 
redundancy the employer can be said to have ‘prevented’ the employee from continuing to 
work for him so as to trigger the implied term of co-operation which must be read into the 
contract in the present case”.95  
                                                          
85 [2017] UKPC 2.  
86 See Yam Seng, note 1 above, at [131]. 
87 Ibid., at [8]; Emphasis ours.  
88 Ibid., at [9]. 
89 [2015] UKSC 72. 
90 [2017] UKPC 2 [7]; Emphasis ours.  
91 Ibid; Emphasis ours.  
92 Ibid., at [10]. 
93 Ibid., at [11]. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid., at [18]. 
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Leggatt, as Lord Justice of Appeal, has reiterated his views on relational contracts and 
the role of good faith in Sheikh Tahnoon Bin Saeed Bin Shakhboot Al Nehayan v Ioannis Kent, 
which concerned an oral joint venture agreement:96    
 
… ‘relational’ contracts involve trust and confidence but of a different kind from that 
involved in fiduciary relationships. The trust is not in the loyal subordination by one 
party of its own interests to those of another. It is trust that the other party will act with 
integrity and in a spirit of cooperation. The legitimate expectations which the law 
should protect in relationships of this kind are embodied in the normative standard of 
good faith.97 
 
He defined the contract between the parties as relational because of the “nature of their 
relationship”.98 Notably, it seems that a key factor in the decision was the friendship between 
them. Leggatt LJ explicitly emphasized that “… [the] collaboration was formed and conducted 
on the basis of a personal friendship and involved much greater mutual trust than is inherent in 
an ordinary contractual bargain between shareholders in a company”.99 What is more 
interesting, from a comparative perspective, is that similarly to his approach in Yam Seng, he 
tied the notion of cooperation to good faith although he did not refer to it as a stand-alone duty. 




Overall, the “duty to cooperate” is most eagerly established with regard to conditional 
obligations. Faithful to the objective approach to the interpretation of contract, common law 
judges consider the literal meaning of the terms and the relationship between the various 
provisions in context in order to decide if a “duty to cooperate” is necessary to make the 
agreement work and to delineate its implications. Absent an explicit provision requiring 
performance in good faith, many English judges are cautious to refer to the notion of good faith 
and would rather revert to the principle of cooperation.  
Compared to other judges, Leggatt LJ seems eager to establish the notion of “relational 
contract” in English law and to affirm a broader conception of good faith, which encompasses 
a “duty to cooperate”. In that light, Beatson LJ’s account of Leggatt J’s approach in Globe 
Motors discussed above may be taken as a favorable nod to Leggatt, but also as subtle critique. 
Beatson LJ’s claim that good faith can be established in certain long-term contracts when 
characterized as a “duty to cooperate” appears less ambitious than Leggatt LJ’s view. Hence, 
it may be more acceptable to an English audience because, as seen above, the “duty to 
cooperate” is long-established and relatively flexible, but still confined within limits. At this 
stage, of course, it seems premature to predict whether Leggatt LJ’s notion of relational 
                                                          
96 [2018] EWHC 333 (Comm). 
97 Ibid., at [167]. 
98 Ibid., at [173] and [174]. 
99 Ibid., at [173].  
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contract and conception of good faith will gain more support in the future. The fact that he is 
Lord Justice of Appeal may pave the way. 
Having established the scope and doctrinal underpinning of cooperation in the English 
tradition, we turn to the French legal landscape. 
 
 
COOPERATION – A COMPLEX DUTY WHICH LIVES IN THE SHADOW OF 
“FRENCH” GOOD FAITH 
 
Good faith is a key principle of French contract law, which has been examined extensively in 
case law and which has been codified following the 2016 reform. At the same time, we will 
see that the explicit recognition of a “duty to cooperate” by the French judiciary happened later 
than in England. Although the scope of this duty and its relationship with good faith, as well 
as its relationship with other duties derived from good faith. are subject to debate, it is clear 
that cooperating à l’anglaise and cooperating à la française entail different things.  
 
Scope of “French” Good Faith 
 
In the French legal tradition, good faith is an ever-changing notion — a “concept mou”100 
(malleable concept) — that has evolved over time and attracted much commentary. Although 
not formally declared as a general principle of law in ordonnance n° 2016-131 of 10 February 
2016, which implemented a major reform in the French law of obligations, informally it is 
understood to be one because it appears in a chapter entitled “Preliminary Dispositions”, which 
precedes the rules on contract.101 Some leading French authorities have asserted that good faith 
can now be considered as a “guiding principle” (principe directeur) of the law of contract.102 
Others perceive good faith as a duty. Although there is no reference to an actual duty of good 
faith in the French Civil Code itself, it has been suggested that good faith “creates a duty that 
precedes, and perhaps outlives, a valid contract”.103 This in turn implies a broader scope for 
good faith because, from a French perspective, a “duty” means a general principle while an 
“obligation” derives from the contract itself.104 In other words, following the reform, good faith 
has gained in normative force and value.  
The current Article 1104 of the French Civil Code provides, in a minimalist formula, 
that “[c]ontracts must be negotiated, formed and performed in good faith”. Prior to the 2016 
reform, former Article 1134(3) required that “[a]greements be performed in good faith”. There 
was not an explicit requirement for negotiation in good faith although judges occasionally 
                                                          
100 See B. Fauvarque-Cosson, La Réforme du Droit Français des Contrats: Perspective Comparative 
(2006), pp. 147-166. 
101 For a discussion, see M. Mekki, “The General Principles of Contract Law in the ‘Ordonnance’ on 
the Reform of Contract Law”, Louisiana Law Review, LXXVI (2016), pp. 1193-1211. 
102 See G. Chantepie and M. Latina, La réforme du droit des obligations (2016), p. 99. 




provided relief on the basis of former Article 1382, which applied to liability in tort.105 
Moreover, even though there was not an explicit requirement for formation in good faith in the 
prior version of the French Civil Code, French courts had developed a jurisprudential solution 
that has now been enshrined in the new Article 1112-1.106 This article imposed a duty of 
disclosure on the parties during the pre-contractual phase: “The party who knows information 
which is of decisive importance for the consent of the other, must inform him of it where the 
latter legitimately does not know the information or relies on the contracting party (…)”. 
One notes several important differences between English and French law. Unlike 
English good faith whose existence is constantly disputed by academics and judges, French 
good faith is recognized as a key principle of the French law of contract. In addition, 
particularly as visible from Yam Seng, even those who support “English” good faith are keen 
to apply the principle to the performance stage only. By contrast, “French” good faith covers 
the whole life of the contract and thus has a larger scope. Moreover, the explicit recognition of 
a duty of disclosure illustrates the weight French legislators put on this aspect of good faith. 
This approach differs from the English “piecemeal” approach — unless faced with an 
uberrimae fidei contract,107 English judges can only provide relief based on the doctrine of 
misrepresentation, which has a relatively limited scope.108  
It should be underscored that, unlike the “duty of loyalty” which is an element of French 
good faith explicitly referred to in the French Commercial Code, the “duty to cooperate” is not 
explicitly stipulated in French legislation.109 As explained below, the “duty to cooperate” in 
French law is a vague notion which has been embraced by leading French authors and appears 
in French case law without, however, having a life of its own.  
Moreover, following the reform which broadened the scope of good faith, some authors 
have pondered why the new Article 1104 on good faith does not explicitly stipulate a “duty to 
cooperate” unlike modern model rules for contract.110 According to Mustapha Mekki, three 
                                                          
105 It stated: “Any act whatever of man, which causes damage to another, obliges the one by whose fault 
it occurred, to compensate it”. See also O. Deshayes, “Le dommage précontractuel”, RTD, (juin 2004) 
com, p. 195.  
106 The French Cour de cassation has explicitly referred to an “obligation to enter the contract in good 
faith” (obligation de contracter de bonne foi). See pourvoi n° 87-14294; In addition, French law 
recognizes diverse vitiating factors such as error, fraud, violence, etc. See, for instance, M. Fabre-
Magnan, Droit des obligations : 1 – Contrat et engagement unilatéral (2016), pp. 363-420.  
107 While English law does not recognize a general duty of disclosure, it imposes such a duty in 
uberrimae fidei contracts. The classic example is the insurance contract. See Pan Atlantic Insurance v 
Pine Top Insurance [1995] 1 AC 501. 
108 It is fairly difficult to argue misrepresentation of future intentions, for instance. One exception is 
Edgington v Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch D 459 where at 483 Bowen LJ held: “There must be a 
misstatement of an existing fact: but the state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his 
digestion. It is true that it is very difficult to prove what the state of a man's mind at a particular time is, 
but if it can be ascertained it is as much a fact as anything else”. 
109 For example, Art. L134-4 of the French Commercial Code applicable to commercial agencies states: 
“The relationship between the commercial agent and the principal is governed by a duty of loyalty and 
a mutual duty of information”. 
110 Note, for instance, that Article 5.1.3 of the Unidroit Principles 2016 explicitly stipulates such a duty: 
“Each party shall cooperate with the other party when such co-operation may reasonably be expected 
for the performance of that party’s obligations”. Similarly, Art. III–1:104 of the Draft Common Frame 
of Reference states: ‘The debtor and creditor are obliged to co-operate with each other when and to the 
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reasons explain why the “principle of cooperation” was not enshrined in the new 
ordonnance.111 The first is technical because the duty of cooperation does not apply to all 
contracts. The second is political as it would lend too much power and discretion to judges.112 
Ultimately, “a consecration of the principle of cooperation is likely not necessary because it is 
implied in the principle of good faith when circumstances demand it”.113 We will see below 
that judicial references to the “duty to cooperate” are inconsistent particularly because of the 
doctrinal overlap between the “duty of loyalty” and the “duty to cooperate” and the unclear 
role assigned to the “duty to cooperate”. 
 
 “French” Good Faith in Practice 
 
The meaning of “French” good faith seems as malleable as its scope. Good faith is traditionally 
seen as a standard of behavior: “an element of contractual interpretation which allows [judges] 
to impose a certain behaviour on the parties”.114 It often reminds common lawyers of the 
reasonable person standard.115 Indeed, as explained above, one aspect of good faith identified 
by Leggatt J in Yam Seng was the observance of generally accepted standards of commercial 
dealing. However, from the 1950s onwards French judges began deriving a number of duties 
on the basis of good faith — for instance, a “duty of loyalty” (devoir de loyauté), a “duty of 
cooperation” (devoir de co-opération), etc.116  
The notion of cooperation was originally introduced by René Demogue (1872-1938) in 
his famous Traité des obligations en général. He emphasized the co-operative nature of 
contracts and considered that the parties to a contract form a sort of microcosm, a small society 
in which “each must work towards a common purpose which is the sum (or more) of the 
individual purposes pursued by each”.117 Demogue emphasized that the idea of good faith did 
not solely imply the pursuit of the purpose of the creditor (promisee), but had to take into 
account other interests.118 He underlined that the contractual obligation resulted in duties for 
the promisee too — for instance, she should not overburden the promisor, she should facilitate 
performance through positive acts, and she should not refuse to accept performance.119 For 
Demogue, this was the idea of solidarity between the promisor and the promisee in the name 
of the “social interest”.120 
                                                          
extent that this can reasonably be expected for the performance of the debtor’s obligation”. Article 
IV.6.9 (b) of the Principles of European Contract Law provides: “Each party is under a good faith 
obligation to cooperate with the other party when such cooperation can reasonably be expected for the 
performance of that party's obligations”. 
111 Mekki, note 101 above, p. 1209.   
112 Ibid. 
113 Ibid.  
114 Fabre-Magnan, note 106 above, p. 96.  
115 R. Brownsword, Contract Law: Themes for the Twenty-First Century (2d ed; 2006), p. 29. 
116 Fabre-Magnan, note 106 above, p. 96. 
117 R. Demogue, Traité des obligations en général (1931), VI, p. 9: “Les contractants forment une sorte 
de microcosme. C’est une petite société où chacun doit travailler pour un but commun qui est la somme 
(ou davantage) des buts individuels poursuivis par chacun”.  
118 Ibid, p. 16.  
119 Ibid, p. 17.  
120 Ibid, p. 18. 
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Indeed, contractual solidarity was the primary value of an entire French doctrinal 
movement from the late nineteenth-early twentieth century represented by François Gény 
(1861-1959), Léon Duguit (1859-1928), and Emmanuel Gounot (1885-1960) (solidarisme 
contractuel). These authors advocated party equality in sharp contrast to the values of liberal 
individualism which dominated the French stage in the nineteenth century.121 In more modern 
times, there has been a revival of solidarity in doctrinal literature as visible from the work of 
Christophe Jamin (1962-) and Denis Mazeaud (1956-).122 Solidarity, however, plays a humbler, 
even non-existent, role in court practice than in doctrinal writing.123 
In parallel, it should be stressed that the relationship between duties inspired from the 
solidarist movement, such as the “duty to cooperate” as well as the “duty of loyalty”, as well 
as their relationship with good faith appear uncertain, which may be striking for English 





Some authors have defined loyalty as “contractual sincerity” in the formation stage and 
“contractual good faith” in the performance stage.125 It is specifically mentioned in some 
legislative provisions with respect to certain fiduciary relationships.126 In practice, French 
courts often establish a “duty of loyalty” in relationships — notably, in insurance contracts, 
commercial agencies, and employment contracts — where a party to the contract deprives the 
other party of the intended benefit of performance of the contract. The breach of the “duty of 
loyalty” may be evaluated from the perspective of legislation, the terms of the contract itself 
and/or circumstantial evidence, as explained below.  
In principle, the French “duty of loyalty” is characteristic of contractual relationships 
in which trust between the parties is crucial. It may remind common lawyers of the fiduciary 
                                                          
121 Note that English law departed from liberal individualist values much later with the work of Lord 
Denning and the implementation of legislation such as the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.  
122 C. Jamin, “Plaidoyer pour le solidarisme contractuel” in Le contrat au début du XXIème siècle : 
Etudes offertes à J. Guestin (2001); D. Mazeaud, “Loyauté, solidarité, fraternité, la nouvelle devise 
contractuelle? ” in L’avenir du droit : Mélanges en hommage à F. Terré (1999). 
123 On the limited importance of contractual solidarity in French law, see J. Cédras, “Le solidarisme 
contractuel en doctrine et devant la Cour de cassation” in Rapport 2003 de la Cour de cassation (la 
Documentation française, 2004), pp. 186-204; See also D. Mazeaud, “La bataille du solidarisme 
contractuel: du feu, des cendres, des braises” in Mélanges J. Hauser (2012). 
124 It has been argued: “English contract law has not been rich in its theoretical content: one would not 
commend English law for its conceptual elegance”. See E. McKendrick, “Contract: Rich Past, an 
Uncertain Future?”, Current Legal Problems, L (1997), p. 56. 
125 See G. Cornu, Vocabulaire juridique (6th ed; 2004) p. 552.  
126 Loyalty is especially relevant to specific fiduciary relationships, such as the provision of investment 
services, where the necessity to facilitate the performance of the contract may even demand that the 
interests of the contracting party be taken into consideration. Article L533-1 of the French Code 
monétaire et financier states: “Investment service providers act in an honest, loyal, and professional 
manner, which favors market integrity”. Loyalty is also expected in commercial agencies pursuant to 
Art. L134-4 of the French Commercial Code.  
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duties that exist in specific contracts in English law.127 In Bristol and West Building Society v 
Mothew, for instance, the Court of Appeal held that “[the] distinguishing obligation of a 
fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty”.128  
It may not be surprising for English lawyers that commercial agencies are an area in 
which French courts are particularly eager to enforce a “duty of loyalty”. Both the United 
Kingdom and France have transposed Directive 86/653 on the coordination of the laws of the 
Member States relating to self-employed commercial agents, which imposes an obligation to 
act in good faith.129 Moreover, the common law has long recognized the “duty of loyalty” as a 
fiduciary duty. It should be pointed out, however, that whereas the United Kingdom transposed 
the Directive almost verbatim,130 France seems to have gone further. Article L134-4 of the 
French Commercial Code defines the commercial agency as a contract in the “common interest 
of the parties”. It also states: “The relationship between the commercial agent and the principal 
is governed by a duty of loyalty and a mutual duty of information”. It should be noted that the 
Directive refers to good faith rather than to loyalty. Moreover, Article L134-4 imposes an 
obligation to act as a “good professional” as well as the following specific requirement: “The 
principal must make sure that the commercial agent is able to perform its agency”.131 This 
aspect of the provision may remind common lawyers of the obligation to make the contract 
work, which was established in Mackay v Dick discussed above. The main difference is that it 
forms part of a set of duties, which operate together. 
Recent case law by the Cour de cassation pertaining to commercial agencies is 
remarkable from a comparative perspective. In a Decision of 20 September 2016, the court 
affirmed that the breach of the “duty of loyalty” in a commercial agency constitutes serious 
misconduct, which puts an end to the mandate of common interest.132 This conclusion should 
be contrasted with Crocs Europe BV v Craig Lee Anderson & Anor t/a Spectrum Agencies133 
where the principal appealed a first-instance decision on two separate grounds: (1) the duty of 
good faith under The Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations 1993, Regulation 3 
and (2) the common law fiduciary duty of loyalty.134 It was held that these duties “co-exist”135 
and emphasized that an “agent owes a duty of loyalty to his principal” and that “a single act of 
an agent may be of so serious a nature as to be incompatible with the continuance of the 
                                                          
127 For example, the Companies Act imposes various duties on directors, the Financial Conduct 
Authority Handbook requires high standards of care for investment managers, etc.  
128 [1998] Ch 1, 18.  
129 In the United Kingdom, the Directive was implemented as the Commercial Agents (Council 
Directive) Regulations 1993; In France, the Directive was initially implemented as La loi du 25 juin 
1991 relative aux rapports entre les agents commerciaux et leurs mandants, but currently forms part of 
the French Commercial Code. See Article L134-1 and subsequent. 
130 Regulations 3 and 4 concerning good faith copy Articles 3 and 4 of the Directive. 
131 “Le mandant doit mettre l’agent commercial en mesure d’exécuter le mandat”.  
132 Chambre commerciale, pourvoi n° 15-12994; “[Le] manquement...à son obligation de loyauté était 
constitutif d'une faute grave portant atteinte à la finalité du mandat d'intérêt commun”; See also 22 
November 2016, Chambre commerciale, pourvoi n° 15-17131 in which the court underscores that a 
breach of the “duty of loyalty” constitutes serious misconduct. 
133 [2012] EWCA Civ 1400. 
134 Ibid., at [3]. 
135 Ibid., at [22]. 
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principal/agent relationship”.136 However, “not every duty owed by a fiduciary is a fiduciary 
duty …”.137 Regarding Regulation 3, the court held that “[a breach] of the duty of good faith 
goes to the root of the contract entitling the innocent principal to decide whether or not to 
terminate”138 and that “[there] is no basis for holding that [Regulation 3] goes further and 
implies [the obligations it sets out] as fundamental conditions into the agency contract so that 
breach of them would always be repudiatory”.139  
In light of this discussion, it is interesting that one may see a certain parallel between 
the requirements for commercial agencies stipulated in Article L134-4 of the French 
Commercial Code and Leggatt J’s reasoning in Yam Seng — particularly his emphasis that 
relational contracts require “a high degree of communication, cooperation and predictable 
performance based on mutual trust and confidence and involve expectations of loyalty …”,140 
as well as his conclusion that the breach of this duty was repudiatory.141 In fact, one may 
speculate that Leggatt J’s relational contract involves or even goes beyond the most stringent 
requirements of good faith and loyalty for commercial agencies under English law.  
A second area in which French courts have applied a “duty of loyalty” is director’s 
duties to shareholders. In a Decision of 27 February 1996,142 the French Cour de cassation 
established fraud (réticence dolosive)143 because the company director had breached a “duty of 
loyalty” to a partner in the company. In particular, he had taken advantage of privileged 
information that he had hidden from another partner to acquire the shares of the latter at a 
certain price and resell them at a higher price whereas the selling partner would not have 
contracted at the agreed price if he had known this information. It may be striking for an English 
audience144 that this is the first decision in which the French Cour de cassation established that 
a director owed a “duty of loyalty” to a shareholder,145 which, in turn, sparked wide press 
coverage.146 
                                                          
136 Ibid., at [24]. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid., at [35]. 
139 Ibid., at [45].  
140 Yam Seng, note 1 above, at [142]. 
141 Ibid., at [171]. 
142 Chambre commerciale, pourvoi n° 94-11241. 
143 Fraud is one of the vitiating factors under French law. Former Article 1116 of the French Civil Code, 
which was relevant at the time, stated: “Fraud is a ground for annulment of a contract where the schemes 
used by one of the parties are such that it is obvious that, without them, the other party would not have 
entered into the contract. It may not be presumed and must be proved”. Note that following the 2016 
reform, fraud is governed by current Articles 1137 and 1138. Article 1138 now states: “Fraud is equally 
established where it originates from the other party’s representative, a person who manages his affairs, 
his employee or one standing surety for him”. 
144 The duty of loyalty can be currently found in Chapter 2 of Part 10 of the Companies Act 2006, but 
it was recognized in the common law as early as the nineteenth century. See, for instance, J. Lowry, 
“The Duty of Loyalty of Company Directors: Bridging the Accountability Gap Through Efficient 
Disclosure”, Cambridge Law Journal, LXVIII (2009), pp. 607-622. 
145 “devoir de loyauté qui s'impose au dirigeant d'une société à l'égard de tout associé, en particulier 
lorsqu'il en est intermédiaire pour le reclassement de sa participation”. 
146 See O. Camoin, “Le devoir de loyauté du dirigeant reconnu par la Cour de cassation”, Les Echos 
(Paris, 14 October 1996).  
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Furthermore, on occasion French courts seem to treat loyalty and good faith as two 
separate categories. For example, in a Decision of 30 October 2007,147 the French Cour de 
cassation established that a consulting company was in breach of an “obligation of independent 
advice” (obligation d’indépendance dans les conseils donnés) because it did not disclose to a 
company which it was consulting that its president had become an employee of a competitor. 
In turn, for the court, this meant that the consulting company failed to provide “loyal” and 
“good faith” performance, as required by the terms of the agreement, in which the consultant 
had committed to “respect the professional, ethical and independence standards in the given 
advice, to accomplish its missions in a spirit of rigorous independence to the third persons and 
in the best interests of his client as well as to inform him of his personal and financial interests 
likely to influence the course of a mission”.  
This case seems peculiar because the Cour de cassation based its conclusion on the 
specific wording of the agreement rather than on the former Article 1134 of the French Civil 
Code, which required performance in good faith. In fact, it deemed that “the mere fact that the 
head of a company enters into an employment contract with a company competing with the 
one on whose behalf that company is carrying out a consulting assignment is, on its own, 
insufficient to characterize a failure to fulfill the duty to loyalty of this company” pursuant to 
Article 1134. In other words, the decision shows that even though good faith is a guiding 
principle of the French law of contract, the precise wording in the agreement is of utmost 




French scholarship seems divided on the definition and scope of cooperation. Some authors 
have underlined: “The principle of cooperation refers to the idea that good faith cannot be 
reduced to the absence of bad faith because good faith presupposes active conduct that 
concerns, at least in part, the interests of the other party. Although the duty of cooperation can 
be seen as relevant to all contracts, it is especially important when the parties are pursuing a 
common interest or goal”.148 Other authorities contend that these contracts imply the strong 
affectio contractus that can be found in concession agreements, franchise agreements and 
supply contracts.149 Yet, some authors assimilate the notion of good faith with loyalty and 
derive a duty to collaborate or cooperate from a duty of loyalty.150 For some scholars, the “duty 
to cooperate” is limited to certain contracts that have a strong feature of “relationship” — for 
example, relational contracts, alliance agreements or cooperation agreements, employment 
contracts, and so on.151  
                                                          
147 Chambre commerciale, pourvoi n° 06-20944.  
148 Mekki, note 101 above, p. 1208.   
149 J. Mestre, “L’évolution du contrat en droit privé français” in L’évolution contemporaine du droit des 
contrats (PUF, 1986), pages 41 and 51; See also C. Guelfucci-Thibierge, “Libres propos sur la 
transformation du droit des contrats”, RTD civ, VI (1997), p. 357.  
150 See Y. Picod, Le devoir de loyauté dans l'exécution du contrat (1989) p. 11. See also J. Mestre, 
“D’une exigence de bonne foi à un esprit de collaboration”, RTD civ, LXXXV (1986), p. 101. 
151 See Y. Lequette, ‘Bilan des solidarismes contractuels’ in Mélanges P Didier: Etudes de droit privé 
(2008), p. 247.  
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As mentioned above, French legislation does not explicitly mention the term 
cooperation. Case law, however, shows that the duty can take many forms and may be relevant 
to many types of contracts — franchise agreements, commission-affiliation agreements, 
commercial agencies, leases, insurance contracts, service agreements, etc. Furthermore, we 
will see below that the scope of cooperation in the French tradition seems broader than 
cooperation in the English tradition. It may imply different things depending on the specific 
circumstances. In some instances, courts have concluded that the contracting party should 
provide all requisite documents or administrative authorizations for the performance of the 
contract. Another form is to reason a contrario: courts may imply that the party refrains from 
making the performance of the contract more difficult. A third aspect of the duty is the 
promotion of meaningful communication between the parties. Generally, French legal practice 
appears inconsistent regarding the legal basis of the duty and its relationship with other duties, 
such as the “duty of loyalty”.152   
In recent years, for instance, the French Cour de cassation has identified a “duty to 
cooperate” both in franchise153 and in commission-affiliation154 agreements because the 
contracts were entered into “in the common interest of the parties”, as specified in Article L330-
3 of the French Commercial Code.155 These decisions do not explicitly refer to good faith. Yet, 
in a Decision of 29 March 2017, the Cour de cassation has derived a “duty to cooperate” in a 
franchise agreement on the basis of former Article 1134(3) of the French Civil Code, which 
required performance in good faith.156 The same decision identifies loyalty and cooperation as 
duties “associated with good faith”. At the same time, the court concluded that the fact that the 
franchisor was forced to remind the franchisee on three occasions during a three-year period of 
its obligation to communicate its monthly summary of purchases did not violate Article 1134 
because one could identify rare omissions rather than a “definitive and constant refusal”. 
In a similar fashion, in a case of 15 September 2009 concerning a commercial agency 
agreement,157 the Cour de cassation emphasized in light of former Article 1134 of the French 
Civil Code that “like any convention, the mandate … should be performed in good faith”. It 
also underlined that the duties of loyalty and cooperation should be considered in that regard. 
The agreement in question contained an explicit clause stating that the agent would not receive 
an indemnity if the contract was terminated for serious misconduct (faute grave). The agent in 
question had not kept his contractual obligation to bring 10 contracts per month during the last 
5 months of the commercial agency and he behaved aggressively with the clients. Similarly to 
the case concerning the franchise agreement mentioned above, the Cour de cassation also 
relied on the repetitiveness of contractual omissions as a criterion of evaluation of good faith 
                                                          
152 Note that the question is not conclusively resolved even from a scholarly perspective. Some authors 
assimilate the notion of good faith with loyalty and derive a duty to collaborate or cooperate from a 
duty of loyalty. See Y. Picod, Le devoir de loyauté dans l'exécution du contrat (LGDJ, 1989), p. 11. 
See also J. Mestre, “D’une exigence de bonne foi à un esprit de collaboration”, note 150 above, p. 101; 
For other authors, the “duty to cooperate” is limited to certain contracts that have a strong feature of 
‘relationship’. See Lequette, note 151 above, p. 247.  
153 Decision of 25 March 2014, Chambre commerciale, pourvoi n° 12-29675. 
154 Decision of 7 October 2014, Chambre commerciale, pourvoi n° 13-23119. 
155 The Article is applicable to clauses of exclusivity. 
156 Chambre commerciale, pourvoi n° 15-25742. 
157 Chambre commerciale, pourvoi n° 08-15613. 
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(caractère répétitif des manquements contractuels and leur accumulation). It concluded that 
the agent’s actions constituted breach of contract, which allowed the agency’s termination, but 
they did not constitute serious misconduct, which meant that the indemnity had to be paid. It 
is also interesting that the Cour de cassation based its decision on the French Civil Code rather 
than Article L134-4 of the French Commercial Code, which imposes an explicit obligation of 
loyalty, as discussed in the previous section.  
The Cour de cassation has also considered the “duty to cooperate” in the context of 
leases. In a Decision of 11 February 2016, the Cour de cassation referred to a “duty to 
cooperate” in a lease agreement as “a corollary of the principle of good faith in the performance 
of contract”, without considering a duty of loyalty.158 In the said decision, cooperation was 
implied because a contractual amendment providing for works to be done to adapt the premises 
for cooking against compensation and increase of rent was signed. In a Decision of 13 
November 2013, the Cour de cassation also referred to a “duty of cooperation” in a lease 
agreement which resulted from former Article 1134 of the French Civil Code, without referring 
to a duty of loyalty.159 This time the “duty to cooperate” meant that the promisee had to “take 
into account the financial situation” of the other party to the agreement.  
The Cour de cassation has also referred to a “duty of cooperation” by virtue of the 
specific contractual obligations in an insurance agreement.160 The Cour de cassation, by 
contrast, has stated that in establishing a “duty of cooperation” along with a “duty to inform” 
in a consulting agreement, the court of appeal violated former Article 1147 of the French Civil 
Code.161 Recently, the Cour de Cassation concluded that a client owed a duty of cooperation 
to his lawyer which consisted in disclosing relevant information to him.162 It is interesting that 
the court discussed this duty in light of the same Article. In this sense, it is difficult to draw a 
distinction between these cases and to understand why a “duty to cooperate” was implied in 
the latter, but not in the former. The nature of the relationship between the parties may hold the 
key to the distinction.  
Beyond these contracts, the “duty to cooperate” also appears in employment contracts 
and service agreements, especially in the field of information technology. Generally, courts 
seem to interpret it as the need for communication to define the needs of the user and the choice 
of adequate solutions. The precise legal basis of the duty in these contracts as well as the 
relationship with loyalty, however, appear unclear. For example, the Court of Appeal of Paris 
referred to an obligation of cooperation (obligation de collaboration) in an agreement for the 
search engine optimization of a company’s website and concluded that the client complied with 
it because it was evident from the email exchange that it had provided the website’s key words 
and contents to the service-provider.163 By contrast, the Court of Appeal of Limoges 
                                                          
158 Troisième Chambre civile, pourvoi n° 14-24241. 
159 Troisième Chambre civile, pourvoi n° 12-23373. 
160 Decision of 8 September 2016, Deuxième Chambre civile, pourvoi n° 15-23068. 
161 Decision of 3 April 2013, Chambre commerciale, pourvoi n° 12-13079; Former Article 1147 stated: 
“A debtor (promisor) shall be ordered to pay damages, if there is occasion, either by reason of the non-
performance of the obligation, or by reason of delay in performing, whenever he does not prove that 
the non-performance comes from an external cause which may not be ascribed to him, although there 
is no bad faith on his part”. 
162 Première Chambre civile, 15 May 2015, pourvoi n° 14-17096. 
163 Cour d’appel de Paris, 13 May 2016, pourvoi n° 14-22497. 
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emphasized that there is “an obligation of loyalty and an obligation of cooperation which is 
incumbent on the customer as part of the study prior to the provision of IT services”.164 
However, it did not explain what these obligations implied in the case at hand. In an earlier 
case, the Court of Appeal of Paris stressed the need for “promotion of a managerial state of 
mind” (promotion d’un état d’esprit managérial), which meant that the management had to 
hold a briefing.165 
Finally, it should also be mentioned that explicit “clauses of cooperation” have become 
common in French commercial practice. In principle, in respect of the principle of freedom of 
contract, French courts give effect to such provisions. Decision of 15 March 2017 by the Cour 
de cassation166 is particularly interesting for our discussion because it concerned a distribution 
agreement explicitly governed by the “principles of cooperation”. The court emphasized that 
from this clause as well as from the general economy of distribution agreements, it followed 
that the supplier had to maintain stock which allows fast delivery to the customers. In other 
words, arguably, even absent such an explicit provision, the court could have reached the same 
conclusion based on the type of agreement.  
Overall, the French “duty to cooperate” is multi-faceted and may be established in 
various types of contracts, which are not necessarily long-term or relational. It lives in the 
shadows of good faith and loyalty. It is important to highlight that unlike Leggatt LJ who 
applied a “duty to cooperate” based on context in situations where there was a very brief written 
agreement (Yam Seng) or merely an oral contract (Sheikh), the French “duty to cooperate” is 
traditionally established by virtue of the applicable legislation or the concrete written 




The two sides of the Channel have different views of the “duty to cooperate”. In England, 
cooperation appears to be a long-established, autonomous duty with a limited scope. At the 
same time, it has an uncertain relationship with good faith because of the traditional English 
hostility towards the latter notion. When confronted with contractual provisions, which 
explicitly refer to cooperation and/or good faith, English courts tend to interpret them rather 
narrowly. Absent an express provision, many English judges tend to imply such duties only in 
cases when they are necessary to make the contract work. 
By contrast, the status of the “duty to cooperate” in France is unclear due to its complex 
and uncertain relationship with the “duty of loyalty” and good faith. As seen above, the 
principle emerged from the writings of the French solidarist movement. It may appear in 
various contracts by virtue of applicable legislation or the concrete provisions of the contract, 
and it may have a broad scope. Meanwhile, in the French tradition, good faith is considered as 
one of the guiding principles of contract law, which has gained in normative force and value 
following the 2016 reform of the law of obligations. French courts tend to interpret the principle 
                                                          
164 Cour d’appel de Limoges, 21 December 2015, pourvoi n° 14-01136. 
165 Cour d’appel de Paris, 13 December 2010, pourvoi n° 10-13410; Note that the decision does not 
explicitly refer to the term “cooperation”. 
166 Chambre commerciale, pourvoi n° 15-16292. 
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as a general standard of conduct of the parties in the life of the contract. Unlike English courts, 
they are particularly concerned with disclosure at the negotiation stage.  
In light of our comparison, it appears that the good faith “practiced” by Leggatt J in 
Yam Seng and Sheikh not only goes beyond the traditional English approach, but also beyond 
the French approach. His version of cooperation is reminiscent of the English fiduciary duties 
and the French “duty of loyalty”. Of course, the fact that Leggatt is currently Lord Justice of 
Appeal may pave the way to a wider recognition of the notion of “relational contract” and may 
breathe more life into the principle of good faith in the English tradition. Yet, cases, such as 
Globe Motors, serve as a reminder that the principle needs to operate within narrow limits to 
curtail the inevitable hostility towards it — so long as good faith operates as a “duty to 
cooperate”, albeit extended, it has a better chance at gaining impetus.  
 
